Abstract-Microgrids use renewable energy to mitigate the pressure on the Macrogrid and environment. But the renewable energy generation is fluctuant and hard to be predicted. There are mainly two techniques to tackle with this problem. The first one is installing the battery to buffer the renewable energy and smooth out the fluctuation. The other one is exchanging energy between the Microgrids. This technique is benefit from averaging effect produced by diversity in renewable energy production across different areas. However there still are two fundamental questions which need to be answered: how to deal with several stochastic parameters caused by the renewable energy generation and how to maximize Microgrids own profit by serving their demands and trading energy. In this paper, we design a double-auction based mechanism which can ensure the Microgrids and Macrogrid who is served as auctioneer profits. In addition, our algorithm need less information communication and can help Microgrids get more profits than without double auction. In order to solve the cost-minimization problem combined with stochastic parameters, we introduced the Lyapunov optimization which only need to know the current values without requiring any knowledge of their statistics. Simulation results based on real world data show the reducing in total cost and energy from Macrogrids.
INTRODUCTION
G ROWING attention to the environment and demands of electricity force the power grid modernizing. Power grids install the renewable energy generator, energy storage and transform themselves to the future power grid named smart grid or Microgrid. Then the function of smart grids are widely extended. They need to sense, calculate and control the renewable energy generation in order to allocate their energy to satisfy different customers demands and minimize their own cost. However using renewable energy has its own deficits. For example, the renewable energy generation is hard to be predicted. These characteristics may sometimes force the Microgrids to ignore some demands. No matter how, the stability
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and reliability are the most important factors of the Microgrids. If the power produced by the renewable generators cannot satisfy all demands, Microgrids have to find other way and ensure the stability. In order to make Microgrids to be more satisfied, there are two possible way. The first one is to install batteries into the Microgrids [6] . When there is extra energy in one day, batteries can store the extra energy in case of shortage in another day. The energy charging in the batteries can help Microgrids dealing with the shortage without purchasing energy from the Macrogrids. However, Batteries are not panacea to this problem, because the batteries are expansive and have a lot of constraints like charging and discharging rates and capacities. The other one is that Microgrids are allowed to exchange energy with each other [16] . Todays power grid is consist of hundred of Microgrids. The renewable energy produced in different geographical areas have averaging effect. So the Microgrids which locate at several place have chance to mitigate the problem caused by arXiv:1702.02748v1 [cs.SY] 9 Feb 2017 the intermittent nature of the renewable energy. The mechanism which can pool Microgrids extra energy together will help Microgrids replace the fossil energy from Macrogrid with the renewable energy from other Microgrids. However problems on energy storage and trading still need to be further studied.
One main challenge is motivating the Microgrids to be participate in the trade. When the capacity of battery of one Microgrid is great, the possibility that this Microgrid will attend the trade is little. Then the benefit brought by the trade will be minimized. Another challenge is that if Microgrids decide to attend the trade, Microgrids need to make some practical decision: whether use more energy to serve their own loads or trade? How much money should be charged for per unit energy? These decisions and question are critical to the Microgrids which intend to minimize cost.
There have been several studies with similar solution or smart grid topic. [15] have a similar approach to the problem. The authors apply this mechanism to another scenario called inter-cloud trading. In addition, the double auction designed by the author is not suitable to the Microgrids scenario. [16] want to Microgrids borrow energy from the Microgrids which have extra energy. But when Microgrids have a great capacity battery, Microgrids are tend to put extra energy into battery instead of exchanging. It also doesn't consider about the delay-tolerant loads. [17] and [24] use the double auction to solve the double auction problem. This algorithm have a good performance, but it need iterative double auction which need more information communication and time to reach the best outcome. [18] take delay-tolerant load into consideration, but it don't have a electricity market and need a large capacity battery.
In this paper, we assume all Microgrids are rational and selfishness which just want to minimize their cost and maximize their profit. we intend to design a double-auction based mechanism which can ensure the Microgrids maximize their own benefit, meanwhile the mechanism should be efficient, have potential to deal with stochastic parameters and need little calculation. Double auction means both potential buyers and sellers can submit their bids which are according to their real-time situation to the auctioneer. Auctioneer will choose the selling and purchasing price which can ensure the profits. In addition, the mechanism can let the rational participants put true price into auction rather than the price deviating Microgrids needs. The mechanism only need oneshot double auction instead of iterative double auction which is efficient and reliable. Then a Lyapunov-optimization based algorithm will help each Microgrid to deal with the stochastic parameters and decide the auction parameters. In particular, our objectives will show as below:
• Propose a mechanism which can deal with stochastic parameters to help Microgrids which have distributed renewable energy generation, energy storage and delay-tolerant and delay-intolerant loads decide the price and amount of energy submit to the double auction, meanwhile it can solve the cost minimization problem.
• Develop a double auction which can let both of the participants and auctioneers be benefit from the auction. Our non-iterative double auction is efficient and allow distributed Microgrids attend the auction. The mechanism also will make Microgrids reveal the true needs.
• Through theoretical analysis, we show our algorithm can help individual Microgrid can be benefit when they attend auction. In the remainder of the paper, we discuss the system model and double auction framework in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we show the solution to former problem based on the time average cost minimization problem using the method of Lyapunov optimization, and prove the theoretical performance of this method. Numerical results are in Section 4 and conclusion is in the Section 5.
SYSTEM MODEL AND DOUBLE AUC-TION FRAMEWORK
As described in the previous section, to handle stochastic and trading problem, we design a time average cost minimization plus double auction mechanism to help the Microgrids to be participate in the electricity market. The 
Cost Minimization Probelm
To individual Microgrids, they need to minimize their cost. But both renewable energy supply and users's demands are stochastic. So Microgrids need an algorithm to deal with these stochastic variables.
Battery
Each Microgrid has their own battery which can store extra energy. The energy in the battery can be considered as a queue B i (t). Charging C i (t) is new energy enter the battery queue, meanwhile discharging D i (t) means the energy leaving the battery queue.
To be specific, the batteries have a lot of constraints. Firstly, we don't allow charging and discharging happening simultaneously and batteries have their own capacities.
is the maximum amount energy that battery can be charged safely at a single time, and D max i is the maximum amount energy that battery can be discharged safely at a on slot. In addition, the energy charged into battery should be energy from Macrogrid G C i (t) and renewable generator R
Load Service
The users have both delay-intolerant(DI) and delay-tolerant(DT) load demands. DI load demands need to be served when they come. DT load demands should be served before a certain deadline. In addition, we assume the
, now we define the Q i (t) as the length of queue buffering of delay-tolerant jobs at Microgrid i on time t and J i (t) as the energy allocated to serve the DT loads demands. Similar to C i (t), J i (t) and I i (t) are came from different sources named as G I i (t) and D I i (t) + R I i (t) which will be specific in Table I .
Then in order to make the equation become concise, we denote R i (t) as total renewable energy generated in time slot t, G i (t) as total energy purchase from Macrogrid, X i (t) as total energy bought by Microgrid i and Y i (t) as total energy sold from Microgrid i.
However, the DT load demands can be delayed, but users still feel uncomfortable when these demands cannot be served. So we denote Z i (t) as delay aware queue.
In the extreme condition, both queue still can be stable. We have constraint:
So that
No matter how, the energy get into the Microgrids should be excess the energy get out of the Microgrids
And we want have a better control of the battery, so we formulate a virtual queue.
Θ i will be specified later. The minimum price that Microgrid i can get a unit of energy. It should cover all necessary infrastructure costs ρ 1 , ρ 2 Set by Auctioneer measure the maximum energy can trade in the auction
Problem1 Formulation
The Microgrids want to cost less, meanwhile they can serve more demands. Firstly, we define the U i (t)
Then The average time cost minimization problem is shown below:
subject to:
(1)-(20) 
Auctioneer Allocation Problem
We want to use double auction to motivate the Microgrids to take part in the electricity market. The proposed reference structure is shown in Fig.2 . We show the Social Welfare Maximization Problem(P2)
We denote β i (t) and α l (t) as the sell-bid and buy-bid which may get accepted at time t. (23) make sure the balance between the supply and demands of energy in the electricity market and (24) promise that both Microgrids and Macrogrid attend the auction can get profits. In addition, (24) ensure the Microgirds will not offer energy to and get energy from the same Microgrids, because β i (t) > α l (t)
Discussion of the System Model
We now illustrate some notice on the system models.
• We assume the energy bought by Microgrids from auction only can serve their loads demands. In other words, the energy got from auction cannot be charged into the battery and Microgrids cannot use energy bought from auction for further trading. Because in the real world, we need consider about the efficiency of charging and discharging energy. If we put the charging and discharging efficiency into the system model, we will find that the possibility of purchasing energy for further trading is little. This more complicated model with physical model will be considered in the further work.
• Transferring energy between the Microgrids will cost some of energy. However, the cost of energy can be considered in our model which can be interpreted as a higher price which can cover the energy loss. Moreover Microgrids may use DC power line connection in the future, it will cost less energy than the traditional methods. So temporarily we ignore the energy loss caused by energy exchanging.
• All Microgrids in our system model are selfish and rational. It means they only want to maximize their own profit and minimize cost. They also want to fulfill customers' demands as much as possible.
ALGORITHM
It is obvious that P1 is a time-coupling problem. And there are a lot of stochastic variables in this problem. So we reformulate this problem with Lyapunov optimization theory and convert P1 into P3.
Lyapunov optimization based Problem1
Firstly, we need to define the Lyapunov function as
The one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift can be defined as
And devote a vector
(1)- (20) Then we can have following Lemma.
Lemma 1; Given (L i (t)) shown in (16)
We can have:
where A i is the constant i.e.,
Proof: At first, we can get following equation according (16) 1)
Next we can get:
Then the (27) directly follow. Because A i + E{Z i (t)ε i (t) + Q i (t)T i (t)} cannot change when the slot t begin and we need to minimize the right-hand of (27) and .Then we reformulate the P3,we can get P4
Put (6), (7), (9)- (14) into P4 and consider about the feature of DI loads demands, we can get P5.
subject to (1)- (20) 
Algorithm Properties
In this section, we summarize the properties of our algorithm as follows: (26) should meet the constraints that 0 < V i < V at all slot t,where
Further here we denote Q i (t)+Z i (t) upper bound as Θ i
2) we denote the worst-case delay as δ max i
,where
3) According the definition of virtual queue X i (t)
Proof.We set Q i (0), Z i (0) and X i (0) satisfying all these constraints, then we use induction to prove equation above.
and our target is to minimize the P5. We can find −(
, then P5 can be minimized. According (8) and (16),
To sum up, Q max i
and Θ i can be proven similarly. 2) Then we will prove the worst-case delay δ max i
by contradiction
We assume the DT load demands came in at slot t 0 and cannot be served at slot
, rearrange the equation and use contradiction. We can get:
3) To be specify that β min i as the minimum price that Microgrid i can get a unit of energy. When t=0,
Here we use the condition:
Double Auction
Double Auction Mechanism has two step:
• Microgrids decide the sell-bid and buybid. In addition, Microgrids should submit the amount of energy they need or supply.
• Auctioneer calculate according to P2 and announce the accepted sell-bid and buybid, and the amount of energy that Microgrid get from or offer to the electricity are clear.
Microgrids Decide Auction Parameters
The Microgrids will decide α i (t) and β i (t) based on the cost-minimization problem. Theorem 2: If the Microgrids are rational and truthful, then:
Proof. We prove the Theorem2 depending on different cases Case 1. The buy-bid win, but sell-bid doesn't. Then P4 transform into
, the Microgrids tend to decrease J i (t) which means decreasing N l=1,l =ix il (t) and minimize P4.
, the Microgrids tend to increase J i (t) which means increasing N l=1,l =ix il (t) and minimize P4.
, the cost of per-unit energy and desire of fulfilling DT load demands are balance. So β i (t) =
can reveal the true desire of Microgrid i. When
Case 2. The sell-bid win, but buy-bid doesn't. Similar to the former Case,we can know:α i (t) =
Case 3. Both sell-bid and buy-bid are accepted.
We have constraint β i (t) > α i (t), but as a rational Microgrids, β i (t) < α i (t). So this case is contradicted and cannot happen in a well-designed Double Auction. Case 4. Neither sell-bid nor buy-bid is accepted.
The sell-bid and buy-bid don't have effect.
Auctioneer Decide Auction Parameters
In Section 2.2, we illustrate P2. We show the double auction mechanism in this section. The auctioneer sorts all received buy-bids from Microgrids in descending order and sell-bids from Microgirds are sorted in ascending order in the sell prices.
Next we reformulate the Social Welfare Maximization Problem(P2) based on new conditions.
(39) subject to:
ρ1, ρ2 are set by auctioneer which can estimate
which can maximize P5. We assume β i * (t) and α l * (t) as the solution to the P5, then β i * −1 (t) and α l * −1 (t) will be accepted by the auctioneer. Further more, auctioneer will announce the cox il and coy il as the coefficients which can ensure (40). The result will announced by auctioneer:
The price charge to each buyer Microgrid i of per unit of energy is:
The price pay to each seller Microgrid i of per unit of energy is:
The amount of energy Microgrid i bought from Microgrid l
The amount of energy sell from Microgrid i bought to Microgrid l
Theorem 3. Using the mechanism presented above, all Microgrids will submit the sell-bids and buy-bids truthfully, or they will get lower profit by deviating from the true value of the buy and sell bids in (37) and (38) Proof. This proof is similar to that in [15] Theorem 2, which is omitted here for brevity.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results based on the data from the real world to examine our analysis in the previous sections. 
Experimental Setup
We consider a a network of five Detailed data are shown in Fig.3(a) . For the price of purchasing energy from Macrogrids, we use hourly price of energy provided by the Power Smart Pricing administered for Ameren Illinois data [26] are shown in Fig.3(b) . The total length of data is 120 hours. The maximum battery capacity of both types Microgrids is 3MW. In addition, the max charging and discharging rate of all Microgrids are 1.5MWh. Let V i = . At last, both type1 and type2 Microgrids' β min i = 1. The auctioneer set ρ 1 = 1000 and ρ 2 = 0.0001 which can make sure the most of bid can accepted in the auction.
Results
We compare the cost of all Microgrids on each slot with our algorithm and without double auction mechanism. Fig.4 shows our algorithm can help Microgrids spending less money on the energy. Although some slots indicate the double auction mechanism will make Microgrids spend more, the total costs of all Microgrids are less than the situation without double auction and reduces about 5.7%. In addition, our algorithm can ensure less delay of DT loads demands.
Using double auction allow the Microgrids exchange their extra renewable energy and purchase less energy from Macrogrids. Fig.5 illustrates the energy purchased by all Microgrids from the Macrogrids. In the most of slots, Microgrids using our algorithm need less energy from Macrogrids and it outperforms the methods without double auction about 4.96%.
At last, if Microgrids can make some profits in the auction, they intend to store their extra energy into their batteries. When B max i → ∞, Microgrids will seldom exchange extra energy. The double auction can motivate the Microgrids put their energy into the markets. In Fig.6 , the total energy exchanged in the market will decrease when the Microgrids have a big battery, but Microgrids will not stop offering their energy. On the contrary, they still are willing to attend the auction and get energy with a reasonable price.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigate both time average cost minimization problem and auctioneer allocation problem. The rational and selfish Microgrids which are geographical diversity can attend the electricity market to minimize their costs. We solve the time average cost minimization problem using Lyapunov optimization theory. The algorithm require less calculation and can still figure out a promising solution. We design a double auction based mechanism which can maximize the social welfare and motivate the Microgrids take part in the auction. In addition, this auction can prevent Microgrids deviating from the true value of sell-bid and buy-bid. At last the mechanism only need oneshot double auction which can reduce the frequency of communication.
